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LONG LIVE THE LIE BILL!
Lucila I. van Dam*
What successful defamation plaintiffs typically desire and doctrinally deserve is to
have their reputations restored. Presently, however, a plaintiff who has established
that she was defamed by the defendant is entitled only to an award of damages,
which does nothing to restore reputation. This Note proposes that in addition to a
damages award, courts-if they are to take seriously their obligation to compensate
the plaintff-should order the defendant to retract the defamatory statement. Con-
trary to the prevailing view, this Note argues that the proposed retraction order
does not jeopardize the First Amendment guarantee offtee expression.
INTRODUCTION
Legend has it that at the turn of the twentieth century, some in-
trepid Justices of the Peace in Madison County, Arkansas,
developed a "lie bill," whereby upon adjudication that a statement
was defamatory, the defendant was required to acknowledge in
writing that he had lied about the plaintiff.' As the title suggests,
this Note advocates the reinstatement of a type of "lie bill" as a
component of the relief available to the defamed plaintiff.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press is not absolute. In the defamation context, the Supreme
Court has held that there is no constitutional value in false state-
ments of fact.2 The Court has also recognized, as a corollary of this
principle, that there is a compelling interest in compensating indi-
viduals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory statements.
3
The courts appear to have taken for granted that damages,
which are the primary remedy for defamation, will adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the harm sustained as a result of the
defamatory publication. This Note takes the view, however, that a
defamation plaintiff is only restored to her rightful position if, in
addition to a damages award, she is able to obtain a retraction order
* University of Michigan Law School, LL.M. 2007; Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand, LL.B./B.A., 2004. Fulbright Graduate Award. I am very grateful to Professor
Laycock, who fostered my interest in remedies, and to everyone who made my year at
Michigan Law School a remarkable one.
1. Robert A. Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423, 423 (1952).
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
3. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 348; see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S.
496, 516 (1991); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,456 (1976); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
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against the defendant. Notwithstanding the coercive nature of this
relief, this Note contends that a retraction order is indeed constitu-
tionally permissible because of the recognized countervailing
interests in protecting the private personality, and in compensating
a defamed plaintiff.
Part I of this Note outlines two basic remedial goals which ought
to inform the court's determination of the nature and amount of
relief available to a successful plaintiff. The extent to which those
goals are advanced by the current remedial framework for defama-
tion is explored in Part II. Part III proposes that, in order to afford
proper compensation and to redress the real injury caused by the
defamatory publication, the plaintiff be given the option of a re-
traction order, in addition to an award of damages. In Part IV, the
Note will identify and address each of the potential criticisms of
this proposal, and will posit a theory to explain why, contrary to the
prevailing view, ordering the defendant to retract does not violate
the First Amendment protection against compelled speech.
This Note, in exploring the adequacy of the current remedial
framework, is intended to contribute to the enduring debate on
the reform of defamation law, an area of law that "is almost univer-
sally viewed as unsatisfactory."
4
I. BASIC REMEDIAL GOALS
Although not expounded by the federal Constitution, it is an
important legal principle that a plaintiff, who has sustained injury
to her person, property, or character, is entitled to be redressed by
the wrongdoer:
The guaranty of a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries to
person, property, or character ... inserted in our bill of
rights, the equivalents of which are found in almost every con-
stitution in the United States, are but declaratory of general
fundamental principles, founded in natural right and justice,
and which would be equally the law of the land if not incor-
porated in the constitution5
4. David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 71, 71 (1990); see also
DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the
law of defamation is full of "anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had
a kind word").
5. Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 41 N.W. 936,938 (Minn. 1889).
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Indeed, in the defamation context itself, the Supreme Court has
recognized that there is a "strong and legitimate ''6 interest in
"compensating private individuals for injury to reputation,"7 which
acts as a constraint upon the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and of the press.
The critical question, therefore, is how to compensate a plaintiff
who has been injured as a result of a defamatory publication.
There are two important principles that ought to guide the Court's
determination of the nature of the remedy and of the measure of
relief that is appropriate in any given case. The first principle, dis-
cussed immediately below, is that the remedy ought to have regard
for and give effect to the substantive policy of the cause of action.
The second principle is that compensatory relief ought to restore
the plaintiff to the position she would have been in had the wrong
never occurred.
The first principle that ought to guide the court's remedial de-
termination concerns the nature of the remedy, rather than the
quantum. In choosing a suitable form of redress for the plaintiff,
the court must have regard for the rationale underlying the cause
of action-that is, why the defendant's behavior is actionable in the
first place-and have regard for the nature of the harm that has
ensued from the wrong. The relief ultimately granted must tend to
these two notions as directly as possible.
In the introduction to his seminal treatise on the law of reme-
dies, Professor Dobbs of the University of Arizona College of Law
provided the following insight:
The remedy is merely the means of carrying into effect a sub-
stantive principle or policy. Accordingly it is a first principle
that the remedy should be selected and measured to match
that policy. It should not be broader than the substantive rule
that invoked the remedy in the first place, nor, ideally, should
it be narrower. Though this point would seem obvious, it is
one sometimes overlooked, and a remedy is at times awarded
or denied without any consideration whether it carries out the
purpose for which the law was invoked.8
Similarly, Professor Laycock of the University of Michigan Law
School has observed that "[r]emedies give meaning to obligations
6. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
7. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49; see also Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. ("Society has a pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.").
8. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 3 (1973) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
WINTER 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
imposed by the substantive law ... [I] t is the means by which sub-
stantive rights are given effect."'
The basic point is that the type of remedy awarded to the plaintiff
should, "as precisely as possible,"" reflect and affirm the underly-
ing purpose of the substantive right. In order to give effect to the
substantive right, it is imperative that the courts are cognizant of
the "law's basic purpose in recognizing the plaintiff's claim at all.""
A second important principle in the field of remedies is that if
the Court is committed to compensating the plaintiff, as indeed it
purports to be in the defamation context,'2 then it must endeavor
to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have been in had
the tort not been committed. 3 Anything short of that commitment
fails to compensate the plaintiff adequately.
This Note contends that the current remedial framework fails to
advance both of these basic principles.
II. CURRENT FRAMEWORK
A. Does the Remedy Give Effect to the Substantive Policy?
Defamation is a false statement published about the plaintiff
that tends "to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence
in which the plaintiff is held." 4 Defamation is also frequently de-
scribed as a communication that harms the plaintiff by lowering
her in the estimation of the community or by deterring third per-
sons from associating or dealing with her.5 Defamation can be
9. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-2 (3d
ed. 2002).
10. DAN B. DOBBS, I LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 27 (2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter REMEDIES].
11. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 4.
12. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. at
323; Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 75.
13. See KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 4 (5th ed. 1992)
("One of the most obvious remedial goals in tort cases is to restore things as they were be-
fore the wrong.... While unavailable in many cases (e.g., personal injuries), restoration in
specie is clearly a recognized and legitimate remedial goal in tort cases."); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts primarily to put
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the
tort.").
14. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 772 (citing GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, A CODE OF THE
LAW OF ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 4 (2d ed. 1923)).
15. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
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regarded as an assault on the plaintiff's personality, 6 which may
cause "deep harm."'7
As a "dignitary tort,"'" the defamation cause of action has as its
basic purpose the protection of an individual's interest in her repu-
tation, dignity, and emotional tranquility.'9 The object of the
defamation action is to "vindicat[e] the plaintiff's character. 20 Ac-
cordingly, where possible, the Court should opt for a remedy that
is best able to vindicate the plaintiffs dignitary interests in her
reputation.
Presently, the principal remedy afforded to a successful defama-
tion plaintiff is a judgment for damages. This remedy is consistent
with the courts' general preference for damages awards.2 ' Leaving
aside the vexed issue of punitive damages, there are two types of
damages that a defamation plaintiff can recover: "general" and
"special."
The "general" damages award addresses the personal injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff as a result of the defamatory statement. That
is, the award aims to compensate the plaintiff for the anguish, hu-
miliation, and injury to feelings and self-image that she endured
from seeing or hearing, and knowing that others have seen or
heard, claims about her that are false and that bring her character
into disrepute.2 2 "Special" damages, on the other hand, seek to
compensate the plaintiff for any pecuniary loss that flows from the
publication, such as, the loss of business opportunities, wages, and
trade. Special damages are consequential in nature.3
One of the problems with the damages remedy generally is that it
is extremely difficult, and indeed somewhat artificial, to quantify the
injury caused by a defamatory statement. The courts tend to rely on
market value to determine the amount of damages needed to com-
pensate the plaintiff, but where one's personality is injured, "there is
no market price for such matters, and experts in reputation do not
16. Sheldon W. Halpern, Values and Value: An Essay on Libel Reform, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 227, 238 (1990).
17. Id. at 239.
18. David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 1047, 1047 (2006).
19. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 510.
20. Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 41 N.W. 936, 938 (Minn. 1889).
21. 1 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 3. But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IR-
REPARABLE INJURY RULE 4 (1991) (contending that notwithstanding the extensive rhetoric
to the contrary "[o]ur legal system does not prefer damages").
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (1979) ("In defamation actions
general damages are imposed for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for the harm
that the publication has caused to his reputation.").
23. Id. § 575 cmt. b ("Special harm ... is the loss of something having economic or
pecuniary value.").
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exist " 24 to assist in the calculation. As articulated by one court, gen-
eral damages which are intended to compensate for "injured
feelings, mental suffering and anguish, and personal and public
humiliation ... [are] not susceptible of being accurately measured
in dollars and cents."25 Professor Dobbs has argued, even more ve-
hemently, that "such interests are never measurable in money.,26
That may be true, and quantification is certainly one of the chal-
lenges inherent in a damages award, but it is not a difficulty unique
to this context;27 juries are frequently required to undertake artifi-
cial calculations, most notably, in personal injury and wrongful
death cases. This complaint is not, on its own, a sufficiently com-
pelling reason to dispense with the damages award in the
defamation context.
The real problem with damages as the principal relief given to a
defamation plaintiff concerns the first of the remedial principles
outlined above; a damages award simply fails to capture the es-
sence of, or the policy underlying, the cause of action.
The objective of the defamation action is to vindicate an indi-
vidual's interest in her reputation, dignity, and self-image, but an
award of money simply cannot accomplish this goal.2 The "real
,,29 th
sting of the defamatory publication-the community's signifi-
cantly diminished perception of the plaintiff-is not in any way
alleviated by a damages award. As one commentator noted, "[t]he
basic defect in the present defamation action is its failure to re-
spond in kind to the injury caused by a defamatory statement. The
primary injury resulting from such a statement is to the personal
interest in reputation and not to a pecuniary interest.
"
00
Moreover, according to one comprehensive study on defamation
litigation, defamation plaintiffs "mainly sue to restore their reputa-
24. George E. Frasier, Note, An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Defamation, 20
STAN. L. REV. 504, 506 (1968) (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATION: A REPORT 99-100 (1947)); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 165 ("Nei-
ther reputation nor distress is sold in market transactions, so neither can be accurately
valued in dollars.").
25. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 75 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1904).
26. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 514.
27. But see LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 165 (stating that it is "unusually difficult" to
measure actual damages in defamation cases).
28. Halpern, supra note 16, at 242 ("Of course, money damages cannot restore the
damaged reputation.").
29. John C. Martin, Comment, The Role of Retraction in Defamation Suits, 1993 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 293, 306 (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 108 (1986)).
30. Frasier, supra note 24, at 505; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 771 (citing
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 249 (13th ed. 1929)).
[VOL. 41:2
Long Live the Lie Bill!
tion by setting the factual record straight."3 The average defama-
tion plaintiff does not desire a financial windfall, but merely to
have the falsity of the defendant's publication acknowledged and
her reputation restored to the extent possible.
Given this disjunction between the current framework of relief
and the substantive policy of the defamation tort, Professor Dobbs
would conclude that the remedy must be wrong in some way and
should be augmented to reflect that substantive right.3 2 Part III of
this Note proposes a way of enhancing the current remedial
framework so as to provide an antidote to the sting of the defama-
tory publication. In short, Part III explains that notwithstanding
the problems outlined above, which are inherent in a damages
award in the defamation context, this Note does not propose
abandoning damages altogether. Rather, it suggests that a damages
award is a necessary but not sufficient way of redressing the injury
and restoring the plaintiff to her rightful position. Accordingly, a
defamed plaintiff, in order to be made whole, needs and is entitled
to more than a damages award.
B. Does the Remedy Restore the Plaintiff to her Rightful Position?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that there is a
compelling interest in compensating a plaintiff for the harm in-
flicted on her by a defamatory publication.33 Compensation means
that the plaintiff should be restored, as closely as possible, to the
position she was in before the defamatory statement was published.
Granted, it is somewhat contrived to speak of restoring the plaintiff
to her pre-defamation position, as one cannot simply erase the in-
jurious statements from the minds of those it has reached, but the
courts should endeavor to do so to the extent that they can.
Damages, if correctly assessed, can undoubtedly recompense the
plaintiff for the consequential losses she suffered as a result of the
defamatory publication and arguably can even help to placate the
31. Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight,
71 IowA L. REv. 226, 226-33 (1985). Professor Bezanson spent two years collecting and ana-
lyzing information on libel litigation. Id. at 226. One of his central findings was that the
correction of falsehood, rather than a monetary award, is what chiefly motivates plaintiffs to
sue. Id. at 227.
32. 1 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 29.
33. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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plaintiff for her distress and her loss of dignity, but "[m] oney dam-
ages cannot replace a reputation once lost."
34
A large part of the injury in defamation cases is the unwarranted
diminishment in the way others perceive the plaintiff, and, as
noted above, this is the part of the injury that plaintiffs are most
concerned to have addressed. Compensating the plaintiff for the
harm caused by the defamatory publication requires not just re-
storing her financially to the position she would have been in
absent the publication or providing financial redress for the hu-
miliation and general suffering she endured. Compensation
additionally requires the "alteration of the perception of the plain-
tiff by the community, restoration of the prior perception.
"
0
5
Money can do a number of things to ameliorate the plaintiffs posi-
tion, but it is simply incapable of removing the tarnish on her
reputation. Accordingly, without the retraction, the plaintiff can-
not be fully restored to her pre-defamation position.
In failing to give effect to the substantive policy of the defama-
tion action, and in failing to restore the plaintiff to her rightful
position, the current framework can be criticized for its "blind and
almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and
very serious harm." 6 And it seems that the Supreme Court has re-
signed itself to this remedial predicament.
The destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring is, to be
sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem. 'Yet, imper-
fect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for
vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has
been falsely dishonored.
3 7
The Court's despondence is unnecessary; this Note contends
that it is not beyond the capacity of the law to vindicate the reputa-
tion of the plaintiff, and a damages award is not the only hope for
redress.
III. PROPOSAL: RETRACTION ORDER
In the Norman era of twelfth century England, the custom was
that a "'man who has falsely called another "thief' or "manslayer"
must pay damages and, holding his nose with his fingers, must pub-
34. LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 165.
35. Halpern, supra note 16, at 240.
36. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, 772.
37. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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licly confess himself a liar.' ,,38 In a similar vein, this Note proposes
that, in addition to judgment for damages, a successful plaintiff
should be able to obtain from the Court injunctive relief in the
form of an order compelling the defendant to retract the injurious
publication.
A. Benefit of Retraction
Prominent jurist Jeremy Bentham once declared, "the only ef-
fective remedy [for defamation] is an authoritative declaration
which destroys the falsehood."09 More than a century later, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota reiterated that view, claiming:
[A]s far as vindication of character or reputation is con-
cerned, it stands to reason that a full and frank retraction of
the false charge, especially if published as widely and substan-
tially to the same readers as was the libel, is usually in fact a
40
more complete redress than ajudgment for damages.
The basic idea is that the circulation of the retraction in the
same media source counters the effect of the original statement.
41
That is, when the original audience is apprised of the fact that the
impugned statement was found to be false, it will desist from hold-
ing the plaintiff in low esteem and from continuing to shun her.
The revelation of falsity may even cause contrition in the original
audience. For the average plaintiff, setting the record straight is
the very objective of litigating,4 2 and retraction brings the court's
determination of falsity to the attention of the public in a way that
a typical defamation judgment does not.
43
B. What Constitutes A "Retraction Order"
Retraction, as envisaged in this Note, does not require the de-
fendant to "confess himself a liar," to "correct[] the false part or
38. Leflar, supra note 1, at 426 (quoting 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WIL-
LIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 537
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1968) (1898).
39. Id. at 425 (quotingJEREMy BENTHAM, 2 THEORY OF LEGISLATION 81 (1864)).
40. Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 41 N.W. 936, 938 (Minn. 1889).
41. See Frasier, supra note 24, at 512.
42. Bezanson, supra note 31, at 227.
43. Frasier, supra note 24, at 529.
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parts of the original statement,"' or even to apologize for the inju-
rious publication. Instead, a retraction order demands only that
the defendant publish an unequivocal statement drawing attention
to the Court's determination that the original publication was false
and defamatory. The retracting statement must be as prominently,
"widely and fairly published"4 5 as the original impugned statement.
In acting as a personal command to the defendant to act in a
particular way, the retraction order constitutes injunctive relief
4 6
Injunctions are considered to be coercive remedies because, in
contrast to a judgment for damages, the court can ensure the de-
fendant's compliance by invoking its contempt power.47 A
defendant who fails to comply with the injunction may be charged
with civil or criminal contempt of court.
More specifically, the retraction order is an example of a repara-
tive injunction that "compels the defendant to engage in a course
of action that seeks to correct the effects of a past wrong."48 Repara-
tive injunctions are available to a plaintiff where an existing right
that has been violated can be effectively repaired.4 9 Because of its
coercive nature, the retraction order is fraught with difficulties.
These difficulties are examined in Part IV.
C. What Does Not Constitute a "Retraction Order"
The retraction order advocated in this Note is wholly different
to the retraction remedy contained in the various state 'retraction
statutes,' which "offer [the defendant] the carrot of reduced liabil-
ity, not the stick of an injunction. ,50
Unlike a retraction order, retraction statutes allow a defendant
to decide whether to retract the impugned statement; a defendant
who chooses not to retract a statement will not be punished (al-
though, of course, he may be held liable for substantial damages).
The plaintiff can request a retraction, but she will not necessarily
be indulged. The defendant's incentive to retract is not fear of
44. Id. at 531 (discussing Section 3(a) of the Tentative Draft of the Reply-Retraction
Statute). The defamation proceeding is concerned with proving the falsity of the publica-
tion, rather than with establishing what is the true state of affairs, so a defendant should not
be required to make a correction. Moreover, requiring the defendant to make a correction
assumes a binary world, where if a statement is false, then the opposite must be true, but
that is not necessarily the case.
45. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 519.
46. 1 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 7.
47. Id.
48. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978).
49. 1 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 225.
50. 2 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 301.
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punishment but rather awareness that the retraction will mitigate
the amount of damages payable to the plaintiff, if not preclude the
defamation action altogether.5'
In not providing for compulsory retraction, and in acting as a
defense for publishers rather than as an award in the plaintiff's fa-52
vor, retraction statutes have been described as a mechanism "to
protect libelers." 3 Thus, the retraction statute is an entirely differ-
ent species than the retraction order whose raison d'tre is the
enhancement of the plaintiffs remedial position.
The retraction order I propose in these pages is also different
from the "vindication remedy" which was incorporated into, but
promptly withdrawn from, the proposed Uniform Defamation
Act. 54 The vindication remedy was envisaged as an alternative to the
damages remedy and could be obtained by the plaintiff without
having to prove fault on the part of the defendant.5  The "no-fault,
no damages" vindication remedy was met with intense opposition
and was quickly abandoned. 5
Unlike the vindication remedy, the retraction order I propose
does not require any changes to the substantive law of defamation,
such as the abandonment of the fault requirement. In further con-
trast to the vindication remedy, the proposed retraction order is
intended to augment the relief currently available to the defamed
plaintiff, such that damages would continue to be available. The
question of whether, and how, the damages remedy ought to co-
exist with the retraction order is a difficult one.
D. Retraction as an Alternative, or in Addition
to a Damages Award?
This Note's principal departure from the "lie bill" developed in
Arkansas, and from the "vindication remedy" described above, is
that this proposed retraction order would be afforded to the plain-
tiff in addition to a damages award. The availability of a retraction
51. See Frasier, supra note 24, at 513.
52. Leflar, supra note 1, at 440.
53. Id. at 454.
54. The "vindication remedy" in the Proposed Uniform Defamation Act was drafted
under the auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and is discussed in Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uni-
form Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REv. 291, 308 n.88 (1994).
55. Id. at 308.
56. Id. at 308 n.88.
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order does not obviate the need for money damages57 because the
two forms of relief address different kinds of injury resulting from
the defamatory publication.
The objective of the retraction is to vindicate the plaintiff's repu-
tation. But the retraction cannot, and does not purport to,
ameliorate the pecuniary harm flowing from the defamatory
statement, like lost wages, a downturn in clientele, or missed busi-
ness opportunities. As a result, a plaintiff who obtains both a
retraction order and "special" damages, which redress these in-
stances of consequential loss, cannot be accused of double
recovery. 5 Accordingly, there is no doctrinal difficulty with award-
ing both a retraction order and "special" damages.
The more nuanced question is whether a defamed plaintiff is
entitled to obtain both "general" damages, which seek to redress
the plaintiff for the anguish, humiliation, and injury to feelings she
sustained as a result of the publication and a retraction order.
One view is that a retraction order precludes recovery of money
damages for the plaintiff's anguish and distress because the retrac-
tion constitutes a "reasonable substitute for general damages. "5
9
What makes this approach so attractive is that it dispenses with the
need to have the jury purport to quantify, in financial terms, the
emotional harm sustained by the defamed plaintiff. Notwithstand-
ing this appeal, this Note does not propose substituting the general
damages award with a retraction order, as this substitution would
perpetuate the under-compensation of the defamed plaintiff.
The retraction order and the "general" damages play different
roles and attend to different injuries. General damages are meant
to redress the plaintiff for the emotional distress and anxiety she
endured upon discovering that harmful falsities had been pub-
lished about her, resulting in being shunned by the community.6°
The retraction order sets the record straight, and in doing so,
helps to repair or restore the plaintiff's reputation and to provide
some closure. The retraction order, unlike the general damages
57. See Halpern, supra note 16, at 240. (arguing that a retraction order does not obvi-
ate the need for damages, though for different reasons); see also Leflar, supra note 1, at 441
("[V]indication will often be incomplete, so that additional money damages are also
proper.").
58. The corollary of the principle that this combination does not constitute double re-
covery is that in advocating the retraction remedy as an alternative to damages, the "lie bill"
and the "vindication remedy" seriously under-compensate the defamed plaintiff.
59. Werner v. S. Cal. Associated Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825, 828-29 (Cal. 1950). Simi-
larly, the proposed Uniform Defamation Act, which morphed into the proposed Uniform
Correction and Clarification of Defamation Act, also limits the plaintiffs claim for damages
to the economic loss caused by the publication. See DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF ToRTs 1195
(2001).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 621 cmt. a (1979).
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award, can do nothing to ameliorate the anguish already suffered,
but it can prevent further anguish.
In other words, a retraction order constitutes prospective relief,
whereas the general damages award compensates the plaintiff ret-
rospectively for the injury sustained at the time of the publication
that continued until the moment of retraction. On their own, the
retraction order and the general damages award constitute neces-
sary but not sufficient forms of compensatory relief for defamation.
From a remedies law perspective, it is not problematic to award a
defamed plaintiff special damages, general damages, and a retrac-
tion order. In redressing different kinds of injuries, the danger of
double recovery is avoided. But the question of how to compensate
a defamed plaintiff is not simply a question concerning the law of
remedies. The way in which one goes about remedying the de-
famed plaintiff may have a profound impact on the First
Amendment freedom of speech, and this impact cannot be disre-
garded. Concerns about the impact of the First Amendment are
explored in detail in Part IV below.
In addition to its implications for freedom of speech, this pro-
posal must also overcome two other challenges: basic criticisms of
the retraction order, and the courts' historic opposition to provid-
ing injunctive relief for defamation.
IV. THE THREE HURDLES
A. Basic Criticisms of the Retraction Order
The retraction order has been criticized as ineffective in vindi-
cating the plaintiffs good name. Specifically, the retraction order
has been criticized because of the lack of sincerity said to be inher-
ent in the retraction;6' the possibility that the retraction may never
reach the original audience; 62 and the inevitable delay in "trum-
pet[ing] the news of [the] victory". 63 Alternatively, retraction has
been dismissed as a valuable form of relief because of the risk of
renewing public interest in the original defamation, 64 or in aggra-
vating the injury.3
61. Leflar, supra note 1, at 440.
62. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
63. Frasier, supra note 24, at 514; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344
& n.9 (1974) (observing that the "truth rarely catches up with a lie"). Benzanson estimates
that it may take up to four years for litigation to conclude. Bezanson, supra note 31, at 231.
64. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 527.
65. Martin, supra note 29, at 305.
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The short answer to each of these concerns is that retraction
may well be an imperfect remedy, but retraction is nevertheless the
remedy of choice for the majority of defamation plaintiffs who
want the falsity of the statement to be acknowledged.66 Retraction is
also what defamation plaintiffs are doctrinally entitled to obtain in
order to be made whole. Accordingly, it should always be within
the plaintiffs prerogative to have the record set straight, notwith-
standing the possible delay, the involuntary nature of the
retraction, or the risk of drawing attention to the impugned state-
ment.
B. Equitable Nature of the Relief
The second challenge that the retraction order must surmount
lies in equity's long tradition of refusing to enjoin a defamatory
statement. The explanation for this tradition is three-fold. First,
injunctions were developed to protect rights of a proprietary na-
ture and did not extend to purely personal interests. 6' Because
defamation is a personal right, equity was not prepared to grant
injunctive relief, unless a property right was also implicated by the
defendant's conduct. Second, because the original rationale for
equity jurisdiction was the inadequacy of the legal remedy,69 injunc-
tive relief was not available where damages were an adequate
remedy. Third, because ajury trial is not available in the equitable
jurisdiction, equity would not enjoin a defamatory communication
because it would have the effect of depriving the defendant of a
jury trial.
The traditional arguments against injunctive relief for defama-
tion are no longer convincing. Professor Dobbs has indicated that
"the notion that equity will not protect personal rights is largely
outmoded... Injunctions can now be obtained for personal rights
so long as there is a need for such protection and no reason of pol-
icy prevents it."7° Professor Dobbs also observed, "the damages
remedy is not apt to be adequate where damages are difficult to
prove, as is very often the case, or where the defendant has no
funds, or where the thing to be protected is unique, as reputation
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Injunction as Remedy Against Defamation of Person, 47
A.L.R. 2d 715, § 6 (1956).
68. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 120.
69. LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 4. (stating that the irreparable injury rule "says that eq-
uitable remedies are unavailable if legal remedies will adequately repair the harm").
70. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 524.
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surely is." 7' Furthermore, as I have already argued, damages alone
are not sufficient to compensate the plaintiff because they invaria-
bly fail to vindicate the plaintiffs reputation, which for plaintiffs is
often considered the main injury requiring redress.
While the third argument might be persuasive with respect to an
application for a preliminary injunction, a reparative injunction
would not issue until after the jury has determined that the im-
pugned statement is false and defamatory. Thus, the defendant
would not in fact be deprived of ajury trial.
Accordingly, equity's traditional rationale for refusing to enjoin
a defamatory statement ought not prevent a court from issuing a
reparative injunction in the form of a retraction order.
C. First Amendment
The First Amendment is said to be "the most formidable obsta-
cle"72 to injunctive relief for defamation. The Supreme Court has
held that the "chief purpose" of the First Amendment, which pro-
scribes laws abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, is "to
prevent previous restraints upon publication."73 Accordingly, prior
restraint of speech has been described as the "most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.
74
The Supreme Court has described prior restraints as "adminis-
trative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to oc-
cur."75 The typical examples of prior restraints are administrative
rules requiring a license or permit before the communication will
be allowed to take place, and judicial orders enjoining certain
speech. 76 Court-issued injunctions of speech are regarded as a form
of prior restraint because they effectively place the judge in the
role of censor.
7
The reparative injunction advocated in this Note is not a prior
restraint. The retraction order would issue only after the statement
71. Id.
72. 3 REMEDIES, supra note 10, at 525.
73. Near v. Minnesota ex ml Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
74. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976)).
75. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984)) (emphasis added).
76. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 950 (3d
ed. 2006).
77. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
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has already been published and after the jury has determined that
the statement is false and defamatory. In ordering the defendant to
retract his injurious statement, the judge is not censoring the
speech or forbidding the defendant from repeating the defama-
tory statement. The retraction order simply provides relief to the
plaintiff for a communication that has already taken place. The
retraction order cannot be described as a form of censorship and
therefore does not offend this facet of the First Amendment.
Professor Dobbs has nevertheless argued that there is a "high
probability" that compulsory retractions" "might offend against
First Amendment principles of the federal constitution.' '79 Specifi-
cally, he contends that compulsory retraction might intrude upon
the editorial decisions of the press, may constitute compelled
speech,80 and might be regarded as "an effort to prescribe an offi-
cial version of the truth".s '
1. First Amendment Protection Against Compelled Speech
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is said to
have "established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits
the government from telling people what they must say."8 2 At first
glance, this observation seems extremely troubling for the viability
of the proposed retraction order. However, after analyzing the
leading cases in this area, it appears that the principle is not abso-
lute.
The most pertinent of these leading precedents is Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,s3 a case cited as illustrative of the principle
that the First Amendment protection of free speech encompassesthe ightto efran frm . 84
the right to refrain from speaking, and a case that addressed the
constitutionality of a "right of reply" statute.
Florida's statute, which was challenged as unconstitutional in
Miami Herald, required any newspaper, which had assailed the
character or the performance in office of an electoral candidate, to
78. Professor Dobbs had in mind compulsory retractions pursuant to statute, which may
make a difference to the question of constitutionality, as some of the statutes do not require
an adjudication of falsity, or alternatively, a finding of fault. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at
526.
79. Id
80. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 1195.
81. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 526.
82. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61
(2006).
83. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo (Miami Herald), 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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afford that candidate the opportunity to reply to those charges, at
the newspaper's expense. 5 Failure by the newspaper to do so con-
stituted a misdemeanor.
6
The Supreme Court held the statute to be in violation of the
First Amendment because it "operates as a command in the same
sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish
specified matter, ' with the result that "political and electoral cov-
erage would be blunted or reduced.""8
2. Distinguishing Miami Herald
The main difficulty with Florida's "right of reply" statute, or as
the Court described it, the "right of access" statute, is that it pur-
ported to provide a remedy for behavior analogous to, but not
reaching the legal threshold of, defamation. Moreover, the statute
purported to do this with respect to speech concerning political
candidates and electoral matters, arguably the most highly-
protected speech. 9
What made the statute so objectionable was that it effectively cir-
cumvented the defamation action by allowing a plaintiff to obtain
relief in the form of a right of reply, in circumstances where she
certainly would not have been able to recover under the common
law notion of defamation, let alone under its recently federalized
counterpart.
That is, relief would have been available to the plaintiff without
adjudication by an impartial jury that the statement was indeed
false or defamatory; without any proof of fault on the part of the
defendant or proof of injury sustained by the plaintiff; and without
the defendant having the benefit of the defenses of opinion or fair
comment, both of which are particularly relevant in this context
where the criticism is directed at public figures. The statute had
the effect of carving huge inroads into the substantive law of defa-
mation, creating an incentive, utterly incompatible with the
85. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) (repealed 1975).
86. Id.
87. Miami Herald 418 U.S. at 256.
88. Id. at 257.
89. That the Supreme Court is more protective of communications involving political
candidates, or political matters, is evidenced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), in which the Supreme Court added an "actual malice" requirement where the plain-
tiff is a public official, and in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985), in which the Supreme Court held that where the publication involves a matter of
"public concern," the plaintiff can only claim presumed or punitive damages if "actual mal-
ice" is proved.
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constitutional value of free expression, for the media not to com-
ment on electoral matters at all.
In short, Florida's statute represented the antithesis of the trend
contemporaneously taking place at the Federal level,90 of tailoring
the common law defamation action so as to safeguard First
Amendment values.
The retraction order proposed in this Note does not raise the
same issues. This Note is concerned only with the way in which a
plaintiff-who has successfully brought a defamation action against
the defendant-ought to be compensated. The substantive law of
defamation would remain unscathed.
Furthermore, the retraction order would not have the same ob-
vious "chilling effect"9' as the right of reply statute,92 because
retraction would only be required where defamation is established
as a matter of law. In contrast to capricious, excessive, and "largely
uncontrolled"9 jury awards, which the Supreme Court has been
concerned with eliminating, it is difficult to conceive of any way in
which the narrowly tailored retraction order described in this Note
would deter publication any more than "special" or "general" dam-
ages, which are deemed acceptable. Accordingly, the holding in
Miami Herald does not seem to be controlling in this context.
Moreover, this conclusion is supported by Justice Brennan's em-
phatic statement that:
the Court's opinion which, as I understand it, addresses only
'right of reply' statutes.., implies no view upon the constitu-
tionality of 'retraction' statutes affording plaintiffs able to
prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require
publication of a retraction. 4
As one Federal court observed, "[t] his careful reservation by the
author of New York Times v. Sullivan, leads me to conclude that the
constitutionality of retraction statutes is an entirely open issue, not
90. Miami Herald was decided on the same day as Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974), a case which further limited the common law defamation tort by restricting
the availability of presumed and punitive damages.
91. This "chilling effect" may not be ajustified concern. See Halpern, supra note 16, at
237 (in which he observes "[n]otwithstanding prophecies to the contrary, there is little hard
evidence, although much speculative assumption, of significant press self-censorship").
92. As noted above, the right of reply statute effectively induced the media not to
comment at all on electoral matters.
93. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
94. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo (Miami Herald), 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(Brennan,J., concurring).
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prejudiced by the determination in Miami at all."95 The constitu-
tionality of compulsory retraction orders has yet to be
authoritatively determined.
3. Retraction Order is Constitutionally-Permissible
Since its unanimous decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, the
Supreme Court has been consistently refining the common law
tort of defamation for the purpose of safeguarding the First
Amendment freedom of speech. There are various facets to this
constitutionalization of the defamation action. For instance, it is
now incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the impugned state-
ment is false;97 if a plaintiff is a public official or a public figure he
must additionally prove "actual malice" on the part of the defen-
dant to succeed; 98 and if a statement is a "matter of public
concern," the plaintiff-whether private or public-must prove
"actual malice" if she wishes to recover presumed or punitive dam-
ages.99 In essence, "Sullivan and its progeny ... [have significantly
altered] the common law by the erection of constitutional hurdles
in the way of recovery. ' 6
Yet the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech is nei-
ther absolute, nor is it the "only guidepost"101 in the defamation
context. The Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized two counter-
vailing interests: "[t]he protection of the private personality," a
concept at the "root of any decent system of ordered liberty" and a
basic principle of our constitutional system; 0 2 and the "strength of
the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for
wrongful injury to reputation." 10 3
95. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 483, 489 (E.D. Pa.
1988) ("[A] carefully crafted retraction statute could well be constitutional.").
96. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 77-79.
97. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This requirement departs
from the common law action, which allowed the defendant to prove truth as a defense. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 581A cmt. b (1979).
98. Id. (for public officials); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (for public
figures).
99. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
100. Halpern, supra note 16, at 233; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White,J., dissenting)
(complaining that the Court is consistently "escalating the threshold requirements of estab-
lishing liability").
101. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (StewartJ., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
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The court's task is to strike "a more appropriate accommodation
between the public's interest in an uninhibited press and its
equally compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utter-
ances."'0 4 This Note's view is that a refusal to allow retraction orders
on account of the First Amendment does not appropriately bal-
ance the competing interests; this refusal gives too much weight to
the First Amendment, effectively double-counting or over-
enforcing it.
The basic values underpinning the First Amendment freedom of
speech have already been given due weight in the Supreme Court's
tailoring of the defamation action, which is now a shadow of its
former common law self. In heavily circumscribing the circum-
stances in which a plaintiff can seek redress for false and injurious
statements published about her, the Supreme Court has attached
increasing weight to the value of freedom of speech, at the expense
of the other interests. The scales are tipped heavily in favor of the
First Amendment.
The way in which the competing interest of compensation can
now be meaningfully accommodated, without disturbing that equi-
librium, is precisely by allowing full compensation to plaintiffs who
have successfully jumped over each of the constitutional hurdles.
And, as discussed in Part II, a defamation plaintiff will only be truly
compensated, in the sense of being restored to her rightful posi-
tion, if she is given the option of a retraction order. So long as the
Court professes to be concerned with compensating the defamed
plaintiff, it should be prepared to invoke that principle as a com-
pelling interest justifying a slight incursion into the First
Amendment.'0 s
And it is only a slight incursion. There appears to be a tendency
in defamation scholarship instinctively to regard any proposals of
reform, or any departure from the orthodox position, as "anti-First
Amendment" or as "an intolerable threat to First Amendment val-
ues," °6 thus hampering "meaningful debate"0 7 on whether such
proposals genuinely threaten the First Amendment.
104. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,456 (1976).
105. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 179-80 (1974) ("An inter-
pretation of Miami Herald which makes compulsory access only presumptively
unconstitutional could permit retraction statutes to be upheld if the important state interest
in promoting the vindication of personal reputation were deemed sufficiently compelling."
(citations and footnotes omitted)).
106. Halpern, supra note 16, at 234 (citing Paul A. LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First
Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical Perspective of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60
U. COLO. L. REv. 315, 318 (1989)).
107. Id.
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All that the proposed retraction remedy requires of the defen-
dant who is adjudged to have published a false and injurious
statement concerning the plaintiff is that he publish, to the same
extent as the original communication, the Court's finding of falsity.
This remedy is a far cry from "an effort to prescribe an official ver-
sion of the truth," which concerned Professor Dobbs, or from the
"the intrusive editorial thumb of Government"08 mandated by Flor-
ida's right-of-reply statute in Miami Herald.
On the contrary, one could argue that a retraction order actually
enhances First Amendment values by encouraging the free-flow of
accurate information.'0 9 If defamation can properly be said to act as
a "fraud on the marketplace of ideas,"'" 0 a retraction serves the
public interest in correcting those false and injurious statements."'
CONCLUSION
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state .... Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is
to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
own temerity."
2
There is no doubt that freedom of speech and of the press are
indispensable values in our democratic system of government.
However, freedom of speech is not the only interest that the courts
must take into account in prescribing the proper bounds of the
modern defamation action. The protection of the private personal-
ity and the compensation of a plaintiff who has been injured by the
defamatory publication are also compelling interests. The courts
are ever-striving to accommodate these competing values.
The Supreme Court has affirmed and enhanced the first
amendment freedom of speech by forbidding the use of prelimi-
nary injunctions, by significantly narrowing the scope of the
defamation action, and by restricting the availability of the non-
compensatory forms of relief, namely, presumed and punitive
108. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, How FREE CAN THE PRESS BE? 63 (2003) (quoting the Mi-
ami Herald's counsel's oral argument in the Supreme Court).
109. Frasier, supra note 24, at 507-08, 512.
110. Martin, supra note 29, at 304.
111. Frasier, supra note 24, at 507-08, 512.
112. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *151-52, cited with approval in Near v.
Minnesota ex elOlson, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931) (emphasis added).
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damages. At the same time, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that a plaintiff who has successfully navigated these hurdles stand-
ing in the way of the constitutionalized defamation action has a
strong and legitimate interest in being compensated.
This framework appears to be the delicate balance reached by
the Court. Accordingly, to refuse to make the defamed plaintiff
whole, which requires providing both a damages award and a re-
traction order, is to distort that equilibrium, and to double count
the First Amendment at the expense of those ostensibly compel-
ling, countervailing interests.
If the Supreme Court is serious about compensating a plaintiff
for the real injury caused by defamatory publications, then it must
allow the recovery of a retraction order in addition to a damages
award. Notwithstanding the prevailing rhetoric to the contrary, this
Note considers that providing full compensation does not in fact
do great violence to the First Amendment and is therefore consti-
tutionally permissible.
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